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Abstract
Analysis estimates that more than 80% of all 
current innovations within vehicles are based on 
distributed electronic systems. Critical to the 
functionality and application domain of such systems 
is the underlying communication network. Current 
advances in control networking technology indicate 
that time-triggered architectures offer improvements in 
deterministic behaviour, which are particularly 
appropriate for safety-critical and real-time 
applications. Here we present novel work on the 
formal specification and formal verification of a time-
triggered protocol: ISO 11898-4 - Time Triggered 
communication on the Controller Area Network 
(TTCAN)®. This work has been carried out using the 
UPPAAL model checker based tool set which is 
capable of verifying safety properties as formalised by 
simple reachability properties. These verifiable 
properties are a subset of those possible in a full 
realisation of Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL). 
Three TTCAN network automata and a medium 
automaton were designed. Nine properties including 
deadlock were examined. The results provide a high 
degree of confidence in the correctness of the TTCAN 
protocol specification. The formal verification 
research work described here was conducted in 
parallel with the preparation of the ISO standard 
protocol specification for TTCAN. 
1. Introduction 
Electronic and software content represent an 
increasing percentage of the manufacturing cost of 
vehicles where current estimates are in the order of 
20% – 30% [17]. As with all computerised systems, 
software ‘reliability’ or correctness is of paramount 
importance. This is particularly the case when the 
systems involved are safety critical in nature. Currently 
the automotive industry is pursuing the technology 
necessary for the widespread deployment of X-by-wire 
systems in vehicles [22] [14]. Such systems will 
replace many existing mechanical and hydraulic 
elements in vehicles. For example steer-by-wire will 
substitute the steering column and power steering 
apparatus with a configuration of steering angle 
sensors, the appropriate communications network and 
motors to control the position of the road wheels[19]. 
Similarly, brake-by-wire technology will replace much 
of the hydraulic and mechanical elements involved 
within a distributed electronic control solution. In light 
of the forthcoming X-by-wire critical applications, the 
industry is taking progressive measures to ensure the 
reliability and safety of such systems. One such 
initiative is to use formal methods to verify the 
correctness of these systems. Using rigorous 
mathematical techniques various facets of the systems’ 
design and behaviour may be examined in an 
exhaustive manner. 
This paper presents the recently completed phase-
one of a project on the formal verification of the 
communications protocol: ISO 11898-4, Time 
Triggered Controller Area Network (TTCAN). This 
work was conducted concurrently with the design of 
the TTCAN protocol and provides strong evidence to 
support its correctness. Although TTCAN might not be 
deployed in strict steer-by-wire or brake-by-wire 
applications, it may be implemented in such systems 
which have ‘dormant’ mechanical backup. 
The formal specification and verification tool used 
in this work is UPPAAL [5] [3], developed jointly by 
Uppsala University, Sweden and Aalborg University, 
Denmark. The properties which may be examined are 
essentially invariant and reachability properties, as 
defined by the following abstract syntax: 
ĳ ::=  E ~E
E ::= D ~E1E2~E
Where D is an atomic formula, i.e. either an atomic 
clock (or data) constraint or a component location. In 
addition a number of inductively derived properties 
may also be tested, e.g. bounded liveness properties, 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Networking, International Conference on Systems and 
International Conference on Mobile Communications and Learning Technologies (ICNICONSMCL’06) 
0-7695-2552-0/06 $20.00 © 2006 IEEE 
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Limerick. Downloaded on May 12, 2009 at 04:28 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
etc. As stated in [6] and [13] the simple class of 
verifiable properties are a subset of those possible in a 
full realisation of Timed Computation Tree Logic1
(TCTL) [4]. The UPPAAL tool set has been used to 
verify a number of communication protocols, industrial 
case studies and UML statecharts with real-time 
extensions [23]. In order to examine properties of the 
TTCAN protocol an accurate model reflecting the 
protocol characteristics was created using the 
UPPAAL system editor. Models of three TTCAN 
network nodes and the physical medium were 
designed, while nine formal properties including 
deadlock were examined using the UPPAAL 
verification engine. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
presents a brief overview of the TTCAN protocol. It is 
assumed that the reader has some prior knowledge of 
the underlying CAN protocol, otherwise the reader 
may refer to [16] [7] [8] [12]. Section 3 discusses the 
framework for the formal verification of TTCAN. 
Section 4 describes the system automata. The formal 
verification of the TTCAN protocol is discussed in 
Section 5. Finally, section 6 draws a number of 
conclusions and discusses proposed further work. For 
a more in depth discussion on the formal verification 
of the TTCAN protocol, the reader is referred to [21]. 
2. TTCAN 
This section provides a concise overview of the 
TTCAN2 protocol, for further information refer to [20] 
[18] [11].The TTCAN protocol realises a global static 
schedule for message transactions based on a TDMA 
structure. The TTCAN protocol itself is essentially 
based on the addition of a session layer (OSI layer 5) 
to the existing CAN protocol stack (OSI layers 1 and 
2). Time is divided into time windows and messages 
are scheduled for transfer within the bounds of these 
time windows. The schedule itself, known as the 
Matrix Cycle (MC), defines a finite number of 
message transactions, over a finite time interval. Once 
the schedule has completed it repeats indefinitely 
(much like a weekly bus time table repeats each week). 
Figure 1 illustrates an example TTCAN MC3 and CAN 
                                                          
1 A real time branching temporal logic where time elements are 
expressed implicitly, relative time references are supported and 
interpreted in terms of an additive continuous time domain, that is 
non-negative real numbers. 
2 At the time of preparing this paper the document ISO11898-4 Road 
vehicles -- Controller area network (CAN) -- Part 4: Time-triggered 
communication, was in the Final Draft International Standard (FDIS) 
stage and registered for formal ISO approval.
3 Note: ‘?’ in the context of this illustration represents ‘or’ and 
indicates that two or more messages are competing for access to the 
data frame. The MC schedule is divided into Basic 
Cycles (BC), where each BC commences with a 
message known as the Reference Message and 
terminates with the occurrence of the next Reference 
Message. A BC is subdivided into time windows. The 
duration sequence of time windows in all BCs is equal. 
This regular structure correlates to a 2-dimentional 
matrix, where a row represents a BC, and a column, 
known as a Transmission Column (TC) which 
corresponds in duration to a time window interval. 
Thus time windows of a TC are of equal value in the 
time domain, however they may differ in the data 
domain i.e. they may contain different messages. 
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Figure 1  TTCAN matrix cycle
TTCAN defines a further time interval at the start of 
each TC window (except for TC zero). This interval, 
known as the Transmission Enable Window (TEW), 
defines the ‘launch window’ for the message. 
Messages may commence transmission only during 
this interval, provided the medium is idle. Such a 
requirement ensures that messages released in their 
respective time window do not over-run into the next 
                                                                                         
medium at this time. CANs’ native bitwise arbitration determines 
which message is successfully transmitted.
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time window and thus prevent corruption of the MC 
temporal integrity. 
In the TTCAN Matrix Cycle there are three 
fundamental types of time window: free windows, 
exclusive windows and arbitrating windows. Free 
windows are scheduled bus idle periods; they allow for 
later system expansion. Exclusive windows are 
intervals where a single specific message is scheduled 
to have exclusive transmission rights on the medium, 
without competition from other nodes on the network. 
During arbitrating time windows, two or more nodes 
may arbitrate for medium access. CAN’s native 
medium control access mechanism is based on an non-
destructive-bitwise-arbitration policy which resolves 
conflicts in this situation. When two or more 
arbitrating windows are sequential they may be 
appended to form a larger merged arbitrating time 
window. In this case the TEW for the merged 
arbitrating windows are joined as illustrated in Figure 
1, ( in BC 1, the time windows TC2 and TC3 are 
merged). 
The TTCAN protocol defines two register sets to 
control the transmission and reception of messages, 
these are Tx_Triggers and Rx_Triggers respectively. 
Associated with a Tx_Trigger register set is a pointer 
to the single specific message structure, an index for 
the TC and BC to define when the message is to be 
released and a repeat factor. The repeat factor sets the 
period within a TC when the message is again 
released, provided the message is periodic within the 
scope of a MC TC. Rx_Triggers are similar to 
Tx_Triggers, however they record whether or not a 
given message has been received since the start of a 
given BC.  
Associated with each message appearing in an 
exclusive window is a Message Status Counter (MSC). 
An MSC has a bounded range of 0-7, which records 
successful and failed message transactions by 
incrementing and decrementing the MSC 
appropriately. Figure 2 illustrates the error state 
machine transition behaviour for a TTCAN node. 
There are two levels of synchronisation quality in 
TTCAN: Level 1 and Level 2. Level 2 is an extended 
version of Level 1. In both implementations system 
time is measured in units known as Network Time 
Units (NTU). In Level 1 the NTU is equal in duration 
to a nominal CAN bit time. In Level 2 the NTU is 
referenced to a fraction of the physical second. 
Additionally, Level 2 provides mechanisms to improve 
the synchronisation quality within the network (Level 
2 will not be further discussed here, see [9] [10]). 
Synchronisation of the member nodes in a TTCAN 
network is realised through the creation of a global 
event in time to which all other events are referenced. 
This event, known as a ‘Ref Mark’, is the frame 
synchronisation pulse generated at the sampling point 
of the Start of Frame (SOF) bit of a Reference 
Message. Conceptually on the occurrence of this event 
all member nodes reset a counter which records the 
passage of time during a BC. This notion of time is 
referred to as Cycle Time. System events such as the 
activation of a Tx_trigger or an Rx_trigger are indexed 
using Cycle Time.  
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Figure 2  TTCAN error state transition diagram
As the occurrence of a Reference Message ensures 
the progression of the MC, measures have been taken 
to ensure the presence of the Reference Message on 
the network. Nodes capable of releasing a Reference 
Message are known as ‘potential time masters’ and the 
node currently responsible for the release of Reference 
Messages is known as the ‘active time master’. If the 
active time master fails for any reason then a potential 
time master will release a Reference Message thereby 
synchronising the TTCAN network and ensuring the 
proper execution of the time-triggered communications 
cycle.
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To draw a simple analogy with the way that 
TTCAN works, consider for a moment an airport 
runway, which is a mutually exclusive resource, much 
like the physical medium in the case of a CAN 
network. Now consider airplanes to be equivalent to 
message frames on the CAN network. Then, as in the 
case of airports, in order to realise the maximum 
potential of the limited resource a schedule or 
timetable is enforced for all flight arrivals and 
departures. Similarly in the case of a TTCAN network 
a schedule is enforced for message transactions. 
3. Formal description of the protocol 
A formal representation of the TTCAN protocol 
was created using the UPPAAL tool suite. The timed 
automata used to model the TTCAN protocol are finite 
state automata decorated with a finite set of real-value 
clock variables. For a comprehensive description of the 
timed automata and associated networks thereof, as 
applied in the UPPAAL verification tool, refer to: [2] 
[15] [23].  
The next section provides a brief explanation of the 
TTCAN model, for a mode detailed description please 
refer to [21]. 
3.1. The Formal verification framework 
Uppaal uses finite-state automata composed of 
edges and vertices extended with real-value clock and 
data variables to describe real-time systems. Clocks 
record the progression of system time since they were 
last reset. All clocks progress at the same rate while 
data variables have zero rate and finite domain.  
Edges of an automaton are decorated with one or 
more of three possible types of labels: guards, 
synchronisation actions and clock resets or 
assignments to integer variables.  
A guard is a conjunction of simple timing and data 
constraints: a timing constraint is of the form C ~ n or 
C – C1 ~ n, where n is a natural number, C, C1 are 
clocks and ~ {,  , !, d, t}. Data constraints are of a 
similar form k ~ n, j – k ~ n, where j, k and n are 
integers. In the absence of a specific guard label the 
default guard on an edge is true.  
Synchronisation labels occur in complementary 
pairs of the form a! and a? where a is the name of the 
synchronisation channel, ! denotes the sending 
component and ? denotes the receiving component. 
Absence of a synchronisation label on an edge implies 
an internal (non-synchronised) transition path.
A system of timed automata consists of a number of 
individual automatons; each in effect simular to a state 
machine structure. As is the general case in state 
machines operation is executed through the 
progression of action or control from state to state 
along the enabled connecting edges. In order to 
synchronise or coordinate the combined operation of 
two individual automata control transition along an 
edge containing the a! label will force the progression 
of control along the complementing edge of the second 
automaton provided the second automaton is ready to 
synchronise on this action. To prevent systems from 
delaying in the case where automata are able to 
synchronise, a channel can be declared urgent. This 
label forces the synchronisation action without delay 
as soon as it is possible. The current release of 
UPPAAL 3.4.1 also allows multicast synchronisation 
in the form of a ‘one to many’ channel. 
Clock resets are of the form C := n, where C is a 
clock and n is a natural number. Resets or assignments 
of integer variables are of the form J := n*J + k where 
n and k are integer constants, either positive, zero or 
negative, and J is an integer variable.  
Vertices or state of an automaton may be further 
decorated as either initial, committed or urgent. Every 
automaton must have an initial state where it starts at 
time zero, denoted by the letter O. Committed states 
identified by the letter C i.e. ©, enforcing that a 
transition, synchronisation or not, leaving this state 
must be taken immediately without delay. Urgent 
locations identified by the letter U require that, 
although other transitions which are open elsewhere in 
the system may be taken first, this urgent transition 
must occur without the passage of system time. 
A further mechanism, invariants, may be applied to 
enforce discrete transitions and wait states within an 
automaton. In this case a location is labelled with a 
clock constraint requiring that a transition leaving the 
location be taken within a specified time bound. State 
invariants may be combined with transition guards to 
precisely control the temporal progression of control 
within an automaton. Invariants may also be used as a 
means of defining a bounded time interval, within 
which control may progress from one state to another. 
This construct introduces a bounded temporal 
tolerance on the progression of control. 
3.2. Assumptions 
The TTCAN protocol adds a session layer (layer 5) 
to the existing CAN ISO OSI model. The original 
CAN protocol itself resides on layers: 1 (Physical 
Layer) and 2 (Data Link Layer). The purpose of this 
research was not to verify the operation of the CAN 
protocol itself in detail but rather the operation of the 
TTCAN protocol, hence the UPPAAL models reflect 
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the functionality of the TTCAN protocol while only 
essential services of the underlying CAN layers are 
modelled. This approach is necessary in order to 
minimise the complexity of the model for two very 
valid reasons: one being that exhaustive modelling of 
the entire OSI stack would have been a mammoth task, 
while the other being that the resulting verification 
state space would have been enormous and beyond the 
capability of current formal verification technology.
The TTCAN protocol model presented here is not 
an exhaustive model and thus imposes a number of 
restrictions on the behaviour of a TTCAN network, for 
the aforementioned reasons. Only the functional 
behaviour and performance of the TTCAN protocol is 
of interest in this assessment and hence other 
unnecessary detail is avoided.  
The restrictions listed below help to remove 
unnecessary complexity from the model and prevent a 
state-space explosion during the verification process. 
Further iterations of the verification process will focus 
on other specific properties of the protocol, such as 
variable message length, clock drift between nodes etc. 
The primary assumptions enforced in the design of the 
TTCAN model described here are given below, along 
with the implications for these assumptions. 
Assumptions: 
a) The medium does not introduce errors. This 
assumption allows us to dispense with the bit error, 
stuff error, frame error, acknowledge error and 
CRC error checking mechanisms of CAN, which 
are not in question. 
b) All messages exchanged are fixed in length. This 
assumption is made in the context that the worst 
case message length (maximum bit stuffing) for any 
transmission is assumed. 
c) For the purposes of this model all clocks are 
assumed to proceed at the same rate and thus the 
NTU is a constant within the system. This implies 
zero oscillator drift and tolerance, future models 
will relax this assumption. 
Implications of assumptions: 
a) The data field and CRC field are assumed to be 
consistent and correct, and are therefore ignored as 
are the other native CAN error checking 
mechanisms. This follows from assumption l. 
b) The correct acknowledgement of all messages may 
be inferred. 
c) There are no error frames, once a message 
successfully arbitrates it is transferred without error. 
This follows from assumption 1. 
d) Reference Messages are of fixed length (in bits) 
regardless of which potential time master produces 
them, this follows from assumption 2. 
e) Normal messages of the BC are fixed in length. 
Additional points: 
a) Data processing of a logical context takes zero time. 
b) Certain timeout values have been reduced in order 
to help minimise the verification state space. 
4. The System Model 
The TTCAN protocol behaviour was abstracted 
from the text-based specification of the ISO draft 
protocol during the development of this protocol. The 
protocol behaviour was then manually translated into 
automata which represented the essence of the 
protocols operation. The final model defines a system 
of 10 timed automata, representing two potential time 
master nodes, a time receiving node and a CAN 
physical layer, in the context of a Level 1 TTCAN 
implementation. The individual system automata for 
each node were: a combined error state machine and 
error handler automaton, a protocol scheduler 
automaton and a transceiver automaton. Each of the 
three network nodes contains these elements and 
communicated via the physical medium automaton. 
Figure 3 illustrates a top-level view of the system 
automata. 
Each network node group contains a scheduler. 
Encoded within the scheduler is the MC information 
relevant for the correct operation of the respective 
node. The scheduler also contains a local clock, which 
records Cycle Time. Thus, the scheduler determines at 
what point in local time the Rx_Triggers and 
Tx_Triggers become active and for which messages. 
The transceiver automata interacts with the physical 
medium automaton by transferring and receiving 
messages to and from the physical medium and by 
observing the state of the physical medium, i.e. idle 
and busy. The physical medium automaton performs 
the identifier arbitration function of the underlying 
CAN protocol. The error handler automaton monitors 
the progress of the message transaction sequence as 
defined by the portion of the MC held within the 
relevant node scheduler. The function of error 
handling is performed predominantly through the 
manipulation of MSCs along with additional 
information derived from the node’s scheduler and 
transceiver. The error handler contains an error state 
machine segment which evaluates the calculations of 
the pure error handler portion of the automaton and 
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determines the error level status for the node. Figure 4 
provides an error state machine automaton. 
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Figure 3  TTCAN protocol network model 
Each node, once synchronised to the active time 
master, transmits messages and registers the reception 
of messages as per the relevant portion of the MC. For 
instance, Node 1 may attempt to transmit a message 
with CAN frame identifier 4 to the physical medium 
automaton in the time window defined by BC 0, TC 1. 
Provided the bus is idle at the time of transmission and 
media arbitration is successful, then Node 2 and Node 
3 will receive this CAN frame via their respective 
transceivers. If an Rx_Trigger has been configured for 
this message in nodes 2 and 3 then this Rx_Trigger 
will observe that the message has been received 
correctly and the MSC corresponding to message 
identifier 4 will be updated appropriately. Should the 
updated value of this MSC warrant a change of error 
level then the error state handler will observe this and 
act accordingly. 
Design of the formal system is such that 
functionality is distributed in a manner which 
endeavours to minimise the use of synchronisation 
channels and the total number of automata while 
preserving the real-life structure of a three node 
TTCAN network ensemble. The design has also 
considered valuable guidelines provided through the 
UPPAAL discussion group: 
x Minimise the non-determinism in the model 
x Keep the number of clocks as low as possible 
x Re-set variables that are not relevant anymore to a 
specific value (typically 0) 
x Remove redundant states, e.g. those that do not 
exhibit interesting or possibly error-prone behavior 
x Minimise the interleaving of parallel processes. 
(This can often be achieved by declaring states to be 
committed (i.e. they have to be left immediately and 
do not contribute to the state space) 
x Do not introduce unwanted extra behavior that is 
not specifically relevant to the properties you are 
investigating 
x Declare explicit domains on then integer variables 
5. Formal Verification of the TTCAN 
protocol
In this section we present the results of a portion of the 
analysis completed on the TTCAN protocol. The 
TTCAN system automata were created in the editor 
component of the UPPAAL tool suite and loaded into 
the verification component of the tool suite where 
various properties were examined. In order to 
minimise the computational resources required, the 
UPPAAL verification engine was run from the 
command line, this approach removed the unnecessary 
resource overhead of running the graphical user 
interface component of the tool. The computing 
platform was an i86 clone, Xeon 1.7 GHz processor, 
with 4GB of RAM, running LINUX Red Hat V7.1, 
kernel version
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Figure 4  Error Containment automation for node 1 
2.4.15. The UPPAAL verification engine was 
version 3.2 Beta 4 (3.1.64), June 2001.  
It was observed that changing the options in the 
verification engine had a significant effect on the speed 
and memory footprint of the verification process. 
Table 1 provides the resource usage to verify a portion 
of the TTCAN system using various combinations of 
options, the effect on resource utilisation and 
convergence is strongly dependent on the 
configuration of the verification engine. At this point it 
must be highlighted, so as to avoid confusion, that 
selection of the under-approximation option may result 
in what appears at first glance to be an incorrect result 
being reported, however the answer is precise when 
the tool indicates that a state X is rechable, while the 
answer is inconclusive only when the tool reports that 
state X is not rechable. The opposite is true for the 
over-approximation setting.  
The authors would suggest when verifying a very 
large system to experiment with the verification engine 
configuration preferably using a representative subset 
of automata, as this exercise may save hours of 
frustration and CPU time later.  
It was observed that changing the options in the 
verification engine had a significant effect on the speed 
and memory footprint of the verification process. For 
instance Table 1 illustrates the effect of changing the 
settings while the input model remains the same. The 
model in this case was a scaled down subset of the 
entire system. 
With each new setting configuration (A - Q) the 
system was re-loaded into the verification engine, the 
RAM footprint, execution time and query result were 
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noted. In this case the query was A[] 
!(Er_H_S_2S.S39) which asks the question: “will the 
state Er_H_S_2S.S39 ever be reached?”, where this 
state corresponds to error level 2 in the TTCAN error 
handler automata. The system itself was correctly 
configured and not “expected” to reach this error state, 
in fact the design of the automata did not allow this 
error state to be reached. 
Table 1  Example effect of changing the 
verification engine settings 
As can be seen from Table 1 changing the 
parameters in this case resulted in a variation of 135 s 
between the fastest and slowest verification process 
and a variation 147 M bytes in the memory footprint. 
This example illustrates the importance of finding the 
correct verification options for a particular system. 
Table 2 illustrates the MC used in the TTCAN 
system automata. The MC consisted of 5 TCs and 3 
BCs. The table provides the message identifier for each 
message, when 2 network nodes compete for access 
during the same time window the symbol “?” separates 
the possible message identifiers which may be released 
during this time window. The maximum message 
lengths, inclusive of maximum bit stuffing are given in 
NTUs. The Rx-Trigger times for each transmission 
scheduled in an exclusive time window is also 
provided. The source node for each message, the start 
time and end time for all TCs are also given. 
TC 0 TC 1 TC 2
BC 0
BC 1
BC 2
TC 3 TC 4
Message Identifier
Message Length (NTU)
Message Source
1?2
80
1?2
5
120
2
10
130
3
3
120
1
6
100
2
1?2
80
1?2
13
120
3
4?7?11
130
1?2?3
4?7?11
120
1?2?3
8
100
2
Start TC  (NTU)
End TC  (NTU)
0
130
130
290
290
450
450
610
610
780
1?2
80
1?2
9
120
2 Free
7?11
120
2?3
6
100
2
Message Source
Message Source
Rx_Trigger606286 446 766
-286 - 766 Rx_Trigger
Rx_Trigger766766 --
-
-
Message Length (NTU)
Message Length (NTU)
Message Identifier
Message Identifier
Explanatory Comment
Table 2  Example Matrix Cycle scheduling 
information
Verification of the error state machine and error 
handler mechanism in the context of a correctly 
configured MC was achieved using the queries 1 to 9 
listed below. Conforming to current nomenclature, an 
implicit proposition at(A.l) will be denoted A.l. This 
formulation reflects the notion of control within the 
automaton “A” being in location “l”. In addition 
invariance properties are of the form   E, whereE is 
a local property, and    reads: “Always”. The symbol 
“” is the negation operator while “” is the “or” 
operator and  “” is the “and” operator. 
1.  ¬ (Error_Containment_Node_1.S39 щ
Error_Containment_Node_1.S40 щ
Error_Containment_Node_1.S41) 
2.  ¬ (Error_Containment_Node_2.S39 щ
Error_Containment_Node_2.S40 щ
Error_Containment_Node_2.S41) 
3.  ¬ (Error_Containment_Node_3.S39 щ
Error_Containment_Node_3.S40 щ
Error_Containment_Node_3.S41) 
Location names in property one may be found in 
Figure 4, in the lower section of the combined error 
handler and state machine for potential time master 1. 
Location Error_Containment_Node_1.S39 represents a 
location which is entered only if the S1 error level is 
active. Location Error_Containment_Node_1.S40 is 
only entered if an S2 error is active and so on. 
Properties two and three represent similar locations in 
the error state machine components of the remaining 
two network nodes. These queries are equivalent to 
asking the question: ‘the system never enters into 
location Error_Containment_Node_1.S39 or into 
location…..’.
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As these query locations represent the cumulative 
effect of errors within the system a large number of 
possible error conditions can be examined by 
observing a node’s reported error level. For a correctly 
configured system the verification shows that all these 
properties are satisfied, as represented by the 
combination of queries 1, 2 and 3.  
This result formally verifies that a system designed 
in accordance with the chosen interpretation4 of 
specification ISO11898-4 will never inadvertently 
enter an undesired error state. This means that the 
specification itself defines a network node 
implementation which has no ‘hidden’ execution traces 
into the aforementioned undesired states for a correctly 
configured MC, in the previously stated context of this 
model. 
The ‘deadlock free’ operation of the system was 
also verified using property 4 as follows5:
4.  ¬ deadlock 
Verification of the correct operation of the error 
state machine and error handler mechanism in the 
context of an incorrectly configured MC was verified 
using the following queries:  

5.  (Error_Containment_Node_1.S39 щ
Error_Containment_Node_2.S39), with Node 3 
absent
6.  (Error_Containment_Node_1.S39 щ
Error_Containment_Node_3.S39), with Node 2 
absent
7.  (Error_Containment_Node_2.S39 щ
Error_Containment_Node_3.S39), with Node 1 
absent
8.  ¬ (deadlock), with two masters, and with one 
potential master and one slave 
9.  (State_1 == 0 щ State_1 == 1 ) phased start-
up of time masters, with node 2 starting early. 
The propositions 1 to 3 inclusive, were satisfied to 
be correct6. Properties 5 – 7 verify the expected 
functionality of the error state automata, as expected 
these properties were unsatisfied due to the absent MC 
                                                          
4 As the specification document is written in natural language, 
ambiguity, unintentional or otherwise, while allowing scope for 
implementers’ creativity, also provides scope for correct 
interpretation or otherwise. 
5 Note that this semantic for deadlocks uses syntactic transitions, thus 
invariants on the target state have no influence on whether the source 
state is deadlocked or not. 
6 Hence, in a correctly configured system there is no possible way to 
enter an error state. Note, this excludes the possibility of external 
system perturbation, as described in the model restrictions. 
messages when the respective nodes were removed 
from the virtual network. Properties 8 and 9 were also 
satisfied.  
In addition to the afore listed properties many 
additional properties have been verified in the course 
of the model design process. The model itself required 
verification of behaviour at the various levels of 
completeness and paralleled the evolution of the 
specification.
Based on experience gained during this project and 
from discussions with the UPPAAL team the 
following provides recommendations on model 
verification using Uppaal: 
x try active clock reduction (especially if there are 
many clocks) 
x if one suspects a bug, try a depth-first search first 
x if confident that the system satisfies a safety 
property (A[] ...) do a breadth-first search 
x often over-approximation as it is faster method 
(however it might fail to prove a valid property, as 
explained earlier) 
x sometimes, the global/local reduction option helps 
x Upgrade to the current version of Uppaal 
5.1. Computational  
The individual verification calculations consumed 
varying amounts of computational time and memory. 
The properties 1 to 3 inclusive took approximately 2.5 
hours each to verify while consuming 1 GB of RAM. 
The properties 5 to 7 inclusive took approximately 1 
minute per property to verify. We also noted that 
inappropriate configuration of the verification engine 
options (i.e. breadth first search, re-use of state space, 
under-approximation, etc.) resulted in 2 GB of memory 
usage while completing in a little under 20 hours, thus 
based on this experience we recommend that it is 
prudent to experiment with these configuration 
options. 
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented an overview of the 
new time-triggered protocol, TTCAN and its formal 
verification.  
An overview of the formal models of the TTCAN 
protocol, described as a network of timed automata has 
been presented. These automata capture the essence of 
the protocol behaviour and may help elevate any mis-
interpretations regarding the textural specification. A 
number of key properties of the protocol have been 
formally examined, including deadlock free operation. 
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The work described in this paper is novel in that, 
generally speaking, ISO protocols have hitherto not 
been formally verified during the design phase of the 
specification. The removal of errors and flaws in the 
early stages of such design processes pay large 
dividends both economically and in effort expended. 
As J. Author et al. have pointed out ambiguities in the 
specification itself are often an ‘innocent’ source of 
error [1]. Fortunately, a formal specification has little 
scope for ambiguity or mis-interpretation even across 
natural language boundaries. It is therefore not 
unreasonable to propose that future international 
specifications are formally verified prior to release and 
that a formal specification be included as a component 
of the specification release documentation. The formal 
verification of the protocol specification is independent 
of whether the implementation is realised in software 
or in hardware. To date the protocol has been realised 
in software by NEC and in hardware by both Bosch 
and Hitachi. 
The mathematical models presented in this paper 
will now form the basis of continued investigation into 
the performance of the TTCAN protocol. Issues such 
as clock drift between nodes will be examined. A 
number of the model restrictions will be relaxed and a 
more detailed examination will be conducted.  
For instance an automaton can be introduced into 
the system which generates a bounded number of 
transmission failures on the medium, and the 
subsequent protocol error containment behaviour may 
be observed. 
Indeed, as the models created are quite flexible, 
actual systems may be simulated and verified prior to 
implementation. Critical parameters such as worst-case 
message latency may be examined for specific 
messages in bounded error conditions. Different MC 
configurations may be compared and application 
specific control loop requirements may be formally 
verified to be satisfied, or otherwise. A future model of 
an extended TTCAN Level 2 implementation may in 
future be examined, although some semantic 
restrictions of the UPPAAL language may make the 
specification of this feature a complex challenge7.  
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